Introduction
Privacy is widely recognised in international and regional human rights law as a fundamental right that is necessary for the maintenance of liberal, democratic societies. This importance acknowledges that in addition to protecting an individual's personal life from public scrutiny, privacy protection can facilitate individuals' enjoyment of their political rights such as the right to religion, the right to freedom of association and the right to freedom of assembly. In recent decades, protection of the right to privacy within the UK has evolved to be a significant issue as the state has become a 'world leader' in using technologies such as biometric databases and surveillance cameras, and private actors, notably the media, have also used technological advances to gather information on individuals without their consent.
Despite the importance of the right to privacy and the growing pressures on individuals' enjoyment of this right, there is at present no comprehensive privacy law within Northern Ireland or the rest of the UK. Historically, the law of Northern Ireland offered only piecemeal protection for privacy, which a person could only rely upon indirectly. For example, suing someone for breach of confidence was possible provided that some private information had been misused or for defamation if material was published that was damaging to an individual's reputation. It was also possible to succeed in a claim of trespass or nuisance, particularly if private property had been invaded or the intrusion had been insistent and repeated. Similarly, individuals could seek some legal remedies where public authorities exceeded statutory regulations granting them the powers to breach individual privacy in specific circumstances defined as being in the national interest. However, these areas of tort law, equity law and public law protect distinct and specific interests rather than providing a general right to privacy.
With the full entry into force of the Human Rights Act 1998 in October 2000, the right to privacy contained in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) became a direct part of Northern Ireland's law. Thus, for the first time, people in Northern Ireland could directly enforce their right to privacy against public authorities within domestic courts, rather than having to seek remedies at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
However, the Human Rights Act 1998 is not directly enforceable against private bodies, such as the press. Instead, as with the pre-Human Rights Act era, individuals can still invoke their right to privacy against private actors only by relying on an existing cause of action, such as breach of confidence, which the courts can then interpret in light of Article 8 on the basis that the courts themselves are public authorities. As a result, privacy law in Northern Ireland remains a patchwork of the following legal provisions:
⎯ general statutory provisions, such as the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Data Protection Act 1998; ⎯ statutory regulations governing specific circumstances in which the state can lawfully intrude on an individual's privacy; ⎯ common law rules, such as the laws on breach of confidence, defamation and trespass; and ⎯ systems of informal regulation, such as the Press Complaints Commission.
Given the diversity of distinct legal provisions relating to the right to privacy in Northern Ireland, this chapter will not seek to survey each of them individually. Rather it will begin by exploring definitions of the right to privacy on the basis of Article 8. In the following sections, it will explore the extent to which people in Northern Ireland have access to remedies for violations of the right to privacy by public authorities and private actors. The latter section will focus primarily on the media because the actions of print media have produced voluminous case law on the right to privacy in recent years. For a complete picture this chapter should be read alongside Chapter 9 on freedom of expression and Chapter 10 on rights to access information.
What is the right to privacy?
The basis for the most general protection of the right to privacy in Northern Ireland's law is supplied by Article 8 of the ECHR, which reads:
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
From this provision, we can see that although the term privacy is not defined, the Convention nonetheless seeks to protect an individual's privacy within broad, multiple and overlapping spheres of life. Each of these areas will be explored below. The right to privacy enshrined in Article 8 is not an absolute right. Instead, the Strasbourg case law has indicated that public authorities are permitted to limit the right to privacy provided that the interference is in accordance with the aims set out in Article 8(2). As a result of the incorporation of Article 8
into Northern Ireland's law through the Human Rights Act 1998, where a public body interferes with an individual's right to privacy outside these limits, it is acting unlawfully and can be sued by the victim.
Respect for private life
The ECtHR has described the right to a private life as 'a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition' (Peck v UK, 2003, para 57 The key areas within this right are protections for personal information, personal autonomy and physical integrity.
Personal information
The protection of personal information is often regarded as the core of ensuring respect for private life. It has produced a substantial body of case law from Strasbourg relating to the ways in which public authorities gather, store and use personal data (eg Murray v UK, 1994) .
This case law has focused on ensuring that states collect 'particularly sensitive or intimate data', such as that relating to sexuality (Lustig-Prean and Beckett v UK, 2000) or health (Z v Finland) , or engage in covert surveillance (Kopp v Switzerland, 1998) However, such searches must be conducted in accordance with requirements of Article 8.
Respect for family life
The ECtHR has interpreted the right to family life as offering protection to many different types of families. For example, in X, Y and Z v UK (1997) , the Court found that the UK had not violated Article 8 when it refused to recognise a female to male transsexual as the father of a child who was conceived through artificial insemination from a donor. The Court did nonetheless conclude that due to the father's role in the child's life a family relationship between them did exist.
As with other elements of the right to privacy, the European Court has found that the right to a family life creates not only negative obligations on states to refrain from interference but also positive obligations to allow people to lead a family life. For example, in 
Respect for correspondence
Respect for correspondence applies, of course, to postal correspondence but today can also apply to other forms of communications such as emails, faxes or social networking. To date, case law from the ECtHR has focused on the right of a detainee to correspond with the outside world. For example, in Milosevic v Serbia (2011) , the applicant complained that the prison authorities were opening and stamping all his legal correspondence, which the Court found not to be in accordance with the law. Within Northern Ireland, as will be discussed below, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 governs when and how some public authorities can intercept personal communications as part of their investigatory or intelligence functions.
Privacy, surveillance and public authorities
Although the right to privacy was incorporated into Northern Ireland's law by the Human Rights Act 1998, it has recently come under increasing pressure from the state. Technological advances have meant that it is now cheaper and easier for public authorities to collect, process and share considerable amounts of personal data, and the state can now use a wider range of surveillance tools, such as full-body scanners and CCTV cameras. One of the practical risks posed by such enormous data collection strategies in which large numbers of public officials may have access to information is that the data will not be kept secure. In recent years, several incidents have occurred in which copies of official databases containing the personal data of thousands of individuals have been lost or left in public places. In addition, state surveillance strategies often provoke political concerns as they could, for example, impinge on peaceful public protests. In such contexts, intrusions on the right to privacy could have negative repercussions on individuals' ability to exercise their political rights.
Under section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998, 'it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a convention right'. Furthermore, where persons believe that a public authority has violated their rights, section 7(1) permits them to 'bring proceedings against the authority ... in the appropriate court or tribunal' and to rely directly on their convention rights in those proceedings. When addressing complaints about interference with Article 8 rights courts are required to determine: (1) whether the interference was conducted in accordance with domestic law; (2) whether it was necessary to address public security or well-being; and (3) whether the measures taken were proportionate to the intrusion on the individual's right to privacy. In this way, it is possible for the courts to find that an individual's right to privacy was violated, but that such an intrusion was necessary and proportionate in the given circumstances.
This approach requires the courts to determine whether the public authorities appropriately balanced the rights of the individual against the public interest. How to strike this balance will depend in part on the severity of the public interest needs invoked. The state may find it easier to justify interferences based on national security (see Leander v Sweden, 1987, paras 58-67) , than on crime prevention (see Funke v France, 1993, paras 53-57) .
Where a state interferes with privacy rights, it must ensure that there are safeguards to protect individuals from arbitrary interference, that the interference is conducted in accordance with the law, and that strict limits are placed on the power conferred (Camenzind v Switzerland, 1997, para 45) . Assessments of the appropriateness of safeguards will measure the level of intrusion on an individual's privacy in relation to the importance of the national interests that the intrusion seeks to protect. This chapter will now explore how the balance has been struck in recent years in relation to: (1) stop and search powers; (2) the use of personal and biometric databases; (3) the use of closed-circuit television (CCTV); and (4) the interception of communications and surveillance.
Stop and search powers 
Personal and biometric databases
Public authorities within Northern Ireland and the UK, as in other developed countries, have increasingly constructed databases containing personal and biometric information. These databases are designed to facilitate law enforcement, combat terrorism, and enhance public sector service delivery. In addition, where public functions are outsourced to private actors, public authorities may share this personal data with private companies. The ECtHR considered the powers of state to collect personal data in Leander v Sweden (1987) , where the applicant complained that his personal details had been stored on a secret police register for national security purposes, that this information had been shared with the navy so that the navy could vet employees, and that he had no opportunity to challenge the information. The
Court found that in a system applicable to citizens generally, ... the law has to be sufficiently clear in its terms to give them an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and the conditions on which the public authorities are empowered to resort to this kind of secret and potentially dangerous interference with private life (para 51).
In this case, the Court held that the relevant domestic law contained detailed information on the procedures to be followed by the police when sharing personal data. When considering whether the measure was necessary, the Court noted 'the risk that a system of secret surveillance for the protection of national security poses of undermining or even destroying democracy on the ground of defending it' (para 60), but it accorded the state a wide 'margin of appreciation'. provide all medical and occupational health records relating to his medical condition violated his right to privacy. The applicant had been involved in shooting dead a member of the public and the Police Ombudsman was investigating the event. In reviewing the decision, the High Court found that, 'given the highly personal and sensitive data' requested by the Police
Ombudsman, 'disclosure of that material without his consent would entail an interference with his right to respect for private life' (para 21). The court found that this intrusion was pursued for the legitimate aim of crime prevention (para 31), but it had not been carried out in a proportionate manner and hence violated Article 8 (para 54).
The legal authority for the police to take fingerprints and other bodily samples was and the applicants won. One of the two applicants had been aged 11 when he was arrested for an offence for which he was later acquitted and the other had also been arrested but then acquitted. Both had had their DNA samples and fingerprints had been taken, and the police refused to delete these samples following their acquittals. In reviewing the case, the Court found that the blanket and indiscriminate nature of the powers of retention of the fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles of persons suspected but not convicted of offences ... fails to strike a fair balance between the competing public and private interests and that the respondent State has overstepped any acceptable margin of appreciation in this regard. Accordingly, the retention at issue constitutes a disproportionate interference with the applicants' right to respect for private life and cannot be regarded as necessary in a democratic society. 
Closed--circuit television (CCTV)
As frequently discussed in the media, the UK currently has a greater number of surveillance cameras than any other country. In 2011, research conducted by the Cheshire Constabulary estimated that there were 1.85 million CCTV cameras in the UK, a figure that equates to one camera for every 32 people. 
The impact of CCTV cameras on the right to privacy was considered by the ECtHR in

Peck v UK (2003). In this case, the applicant was recorded on CCTV cameras owned by
Brentwood City Council walking through the city centre carrying a knife, which he had just used to try to commit suicide. The Council subsequently shared the footage with a television company and the man's undisguised image was broadcast without his consent on a programme watched by 350,000 viewers. In considering the case, the Court found:
The monitoring of the actions of an individual in a public place by the use of photographic equipment which does not record the visual data does not, as such, give rise to an interference with the individual's private life. On the other hand, the recording of the data and the systematic or permanent nature of the record may give rise to such considerations. (para 59)
The Court further found that the subsequent broadcasting of the event on a television programme without the man's consent or the masking of his image constituted a violation of his right to a private life. The Court added that, although the Council's use of CCTV and the sharing of images with a broadcaster were lawful, in this case the impact on the applicant's privacy was disproportionate. The findings in this case illustrate a legal distinction between the recording and processing of images, in respect of which an individual's privacy rights can be protected, and the mere observing individuals in public spaces, which may not attract any protection.
Interception of communications and surveillance
During the conflict in Northern Ireland, the interception of communications and surveillance were commonly used counter-terrorism techniques. In addition, during the 1970s and 1980s, the UK security services covertly listened to and recorded the telephone conversations of trade union members and left-wing politicians, including members of the government (a process known as 'wiretapping'). Constable, who had lodged a claim against the authority on the basis that she had been refused promotion because of her gender. The ECtHR found that 'telephone calls made from business premises as well as from the home may be covered by the notions of "private life"
and "correspondence" within the meaning of Article 8(1)' (para 44). The Court further found that for such interference in individuals' private lives to be considered in accordance with the law, the law must be: RIPA permits a wide range of public authorities, including police services and local governments, to make requests for surveillance powers. Depending on the public authority making the request, there can be directed and intrusive surveillance, and the use of covert human intelligence sources, provided these are expressly authorised by designated persons such as the police or the security services (ie those bodies listed in Schedule 1 to the Act).
The authorising persons must believe that the authorisation is necessary in the interests of national security, for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime, or in the interests of the economic well-being of the UK (ss 28(3) and 32 (3)). Directed and covert surveillance can also be authorised in the interests of public safety, for the purpose of protecting public health, for the purpose of assessing any tax or for any other purpose specified in an order made by the Secretary of State (s 28 (3) 
Privacy, freedom of expression and the media
During 2011, the phone-hacking scandal involving national newspapers and the debates over the use of super-injunctions brought the question of media intrusions on the right to privacy firmly into the public spotlight. Traditionally, in order to preserve press freedom, UK governments have opted to allow the print media to self-regulate, rather than relying on civil or criminal regulation. Individuals who feel that their privacy has been invaded can therefore complain to the Press Complaints Commission, a body dominated by media representatives.
If the complaint is upheld, the Commission can censure the newspaper or journalist and may even require its adjudication to be published by the offending paper. However, the Commission has no power to fine an offender or to award damages to a complainant.
Since the entry into force of the Human Rights Act 1998, UK courts have gradually supplemented these self-regulatory protections and established a considerable body of case law on the application of Article 8 to disputes between private actors. As the following paragraphs reveal, the case law to date indicates that when determining whether a private actor has breached an individual's privacy, the courts will ask three questions: do the courts have jurisdiction to intervene; is the published information private; and, if so, is its publication in the public interest?
Do the courts have jurisdiction?
As it is primarily binding only on public bodies, the Human Rights Act 1998 is not directly These stated, for example, that a duty of confidence will arise if the party is in a relationship in which he 'can reasonably expect his privacy to be protected' and noted that 'the more stable the relationship the greater will be the significance which is attached to it'.
A landmark decision on the protection of private information was delivered by the Campbell v MGN (2004) , where Lord Nicholls argued that breach of confidence had evolved from relating solely to information that was expressly confidential to include any information a person receives which he or she knows or ought to know is fairly and reasonably to be regarded as confidential. Indeed he suggested that the tort of breach of confidence is now better described as the tort of misuse of private information and that the crucial issue is whether 'the person in question had a reasonable expectation of privacy' (para 21). In the same decision, Lord Hoffmann contended that the tort was now based upon 'the protection of human autonomy and dignity⎯the right to control the dissemination of information about one's private life and the right to the esteem and respect of other people'
House of Lords in
(para 51). In holding that on the facts there was no reasonable expectation of privacy, the court said (in para 36) that it was relevant to consider:
This issue was also considered by the ECtHR in
⎯ the attributes of the claimant; ⎯ the nature of the activity in which the claimant was engaged; ⎯ the place at which it was happening; ⎯ the nature and purpose of the intrusion; ⎯ the absence of consent and whether it was known or could be inferred that consent was absent; ⎯ the effect on the claimant; and ⎯ the circumstances in which and the purposes for which the information came into the hands of the publisher. Is the publication in the public interest?
If the courts find that private information has been disclosed, they then have to determine whether the disclosure was in the public interest. This entails balancing Article 8 protection against the protection of the freedom of expression contained in Article 10 of the ECHR (see Chapter 9). With the entry into force of the Human Rights Act 1998, the right to freedom of expression became a direct part of UK law, and section 12 of that Act outlines requirements for UK courts to address if they are considering granting remedies, such as injunctions, which would affect freedom of expression. The requirements include having particular regard to the extent to which '(i) the material has, or is about to, become available to the public, or (ii) it is, or would be, in the public interest for the material to be published' and to 'any relevant privacy code'. However, under the Human Rights Act neither Article 8 nor Article 10 has precedence over the other (Campbell v MGN, 2004, para 55) .
UK courts have engaged in balancing Articles 8 and 10 in numerous cases relating to the publishing of personal information by the media, with differing results. In Venables and Thompson v News Group Newspapers Ltd and others (2001) , where the disclosure could have had severe consequences for the applicants' security, the court held that: 'This factor not merely rendered the information confidential, but outweighed the freedom of expression that would otherwise have underpinned the right of the press to publish the information. ' In B and A v C (2002) , as noted above, the Court of Appeal, when determining whether media disclosures of the private lives of celebrities are in the public interest, set out guidelines for balancing Articles 8 and 10. These provide that press freedom is itself of public interest, given the role that the media play within society. They further state that courts cannot interfere with press freedom 'where there is no identifiable special public interest in any particular material being published'. However, where there is a clear public interest in publication the Court of Appeal argued that this strengthened the case for publication. As regards public figures, the guidelines state that, although they are entitled to a private life, because of their public position they 'must expect and accept that [their] actions will be more closely scrutinised by the media'. They further state that where public figures have 'courted public attention' they then have 'less ground to object to the intrusion which follows'.
In the landmark Campbell case (2004), the majority of the House of Lords found that there was a legitimate public interest in exposing the truth of Ms Campbell's drug addiction as she had previously made public denials about it (paras 24, 58 and 151). In addition, Lord
Hope said that the courts have to determine whether publication 'pursues a legitimate aim and whether the benefits that will be achieved by its publication are proportionate to the harm that may be done by the interference with the right to privacy' (para 113).
A few weeks after this ruling, the ECtHR decided the Von Hannover case (2004),
where it was held that there was no public interest in publishing information on the private life of Princess Caroline because, although she was a public figure, the 'published photos and accompanying commentaries relate exclusively to details of the applicant's private life' (para 64) and therefore did not 'contribute to any debate of general interest to society', a factor which the court argued should be 'decisive' in balancing Articles 8 and 10 (para 76). In its more recent judgement in Mosley v UK (2011) the ECtHR maintained the importance of the distinction between information that informs public debate and information that does not (para 112). In particular, it confirmed that tawdry, lurid or sensational reporting 'does not attract the robust protection of Article 10 afforded to the press' and it stressed that in assessing whether there is a public interest justifying an interference with the right to respect for private life, 'the focus must be on whether the publication is in the interest of the public and not whether the public might be interested in reading it' (para 114). Thus, Article 8 may take precedence over Article 10 where the information being disclosed is private and intimate and will not contribute to public debate. whether publication of the material pursues a legitimate aim, and whether the benefits that will be achieved by its publication are proportionate to the harm that may be done by the interference with the right to privacy. (para 23) In reviewing the facts of the case, Lord Phillips concluded that the goals of disclosure of personal information by the BBC were legitimate as they related to crime prevention, and the methods adopted were proportionate to these aims. In contrast, more recent judgments relating to press disclosures of the details of the extramarital affairs of celebrities have held them not to be in pursuit of legitimate aims and hence not in the public interest (CTB v News Group Newspapers Ltd, 2011) .
The courts of Northern Ireland have also explored how to balance Article 8 and 10
rights. In Callaghan v Independent News & Media Ltd (2009) , the High Court distinguished between the public interest 'in relation to the debate as to whether it is right to publish detailed information about sex offenders when they are to be released into the community and if so the extent of that information' and the public interest in publishing unpixelated photographs of particular offenders (para 25). The court found that the publishing of the photographs might be detrimental to the public interest where it undermined the rehabilitation of offenders, and that therefore the restriction on publishing photographs was proportionate (para 79). Subsequently, in Lee v News Group Newspapers Ltd (2010) , the High Court held that given the personal nature of the information in this case, concerning the life of Van Morrison, the public did not have a legitimate interest in the claimants' private affairs.
Within the law of both England and Northern Ireland, disclosure of particularly sensitive information, such as the anonymity of rape complaints or the names of children who are party to legal proceedings, is subject to statutory reporting restrictions. However, in order to protect the interests of open justice, these are very limited and specific. In other cases, reporting restrictions are imposed only if it can be demonstrated that the relevant information is private and that its publication is not in the public interest. Where this is proven, the law provides a number of remedies, including injunctions to prevent the publication of the private material and damages to compensate for injury caused by prior publication.
